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Penn, Zenger and O.J.: Jury
Nullification-Justice or the "Wacko Fringe's"
Attempt to Further its Anti-Government Agenda?
Mr. Cochran: [Aind when you enter a not guilty plea, since the beginning
of the time of this country, since the time of the magna carta, that sets the
forces in motion and you have a trial.
. This is what this is about. That is why we love what we do, an oppor-
tunity to come before people from the community, the consciences of the
community. You are the consciences of the community. You set the stan-
dards. You tell us what is right and wrong. You set the standards. You
use your common sense to do that.
Who then polices the Police? You[, the jury,] police the Police. You
police them by your verdict. You are the ones to send the message. Nobody
else is going to do it in this society. They don't have the courage. Nobody
has the courage.
They have a bunch of people running around with no courage to do
what is right, except individual citizens. You[, the jury,] are the ones in
war, you are the ones who are on the front line.
These people set policies, these people talk all this stuff, you implement
it. You are the people. You are what makes America great, and don't you
forget it.'
Ms. Clark: I have never had a defense attorney make an argument like
Mr. Cochran made, nor have I ever seen a defense attorney get up and ask
for jury nullification in this way.
The Court: It was very artfully phrased.3
1. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995), Reporter's Tran-
script of Proceedings, Sept. 28, 1995, Vol. 232, at 47793-8036, 9:01 a.m., available in
LEXIS, Cal library, OJTRAN file. These comments were made by O.J. Simpson de-
fense attorney Johnnie Cochran during final arguments to the jury.
2. Simpson, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 28, 1995, Vol. 232, at
47793-8036, 9:01 a.m. These comments were made by lead prosecutor Marcia R.
Clark.
3. Simpson, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 29, 1995, Vol. 233, at
48037-286, 9:04 a.m., available in LEXIS, Cal library, OJTRAN file. These comments




In People v. Simpson,4 defense attorney Johnnie Cochran
("Cochran") launched a flurry of debate within the legal profes-
sion and the general community with his remarks in closing.'
Many commentators argued that Cochran was sending a message
to the jury that even if it believed Simpson to be guilty, it could
still find him not guilty by nullifying the law. While Cochran's
remarks led to an uproar about "playing the race card," the con-
cept of jury nullification is centuries old. Law students are taught
that a jury finds the facts and the judge declares the
law-however, the strength of this statement has varied through-
out history.6
Part I of this comment begins by discussing what is meant by
the doctrine of jury nullification. Part I then reviews the history
of jury nullification in England, the American Colonies and the
United States. In Part II, arguments against the use of jury nul-
lification are reviewed. Finally, Part III argues that jury nullifi-
cation should be allowed by courts, and concludes that juries
have both the power and the right to nullify laws they find un-
just and oppressive.
I. JURY NULLIFICATION
A. The Doctrine of Jury Nullification
The doctrine of jury nullification is based on the notion that
"jurors have the inherent right to set aside the instructions of the
judge and to reach a verdict of acquittal based upon their own
consciences, and the defendant has the right to have the jury so
instructed."7 The arguments concerning jury nullification do not
pertain to the "power" that a jury has; rather they concern the
right to nullification instructions and defense arguments.8 That
is, most jurists agree that when a jury renders a general verdict
4. No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995), available in LEXIS, Cal library,
OJTRAN file.
5. Fred W. Lindecke, Point of Law: Juries Entitled to Ignore It; The Power of
Nullification Puts Activists, Jurists at Odds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 1995,
at 5B.
6. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Mitchell noted that "[t]he rule, ad
questionem facti non respondent judices, ad questionem juris non respondent juratore-
s, was an ancient maxim in the days of Coke." Commonwealth v. McManus, 21 A.
1018, 1020 (Pa. 1891) (Mitchell, J., concurring).
7. M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative Devel-
opments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1993).
8. See Philip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Mod-
ern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 391 (1989).
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in a criminal case, whether proper or not, the jury has the "pow-
er" to disregard the law as given by the court and render a ver-
dict.9 The "power" emanates naturally from the jury system,
which does not require the jury to explain its finding. The issue
is whether a defense lawyer may make the jury aware of its
power to nullify the law as given by the court.
Some commentators draw a distinction between what they
deem "historical jury nullification" and "modern justice-oriented
jury nullification." These commentators define historical jury
nullification to mean that jurors have the right to determine the
law because they are the conscience of the community and they
know what the law should be."0 These commentators argue that
today jury nullification proponents advocate "modern justice-
oriented jury nullification" which they define as meaning that the
jury should have the power to determine whether a particular
law should be applied to the case under consideration.11 The
commentators appear to draw this distinction by stating that his-
torical nullification cases dealt with juries that nullified oppres-
sive and unconscionable laws, 2 while modern nullification seeks
to allow a jury to acquit a defendant because it would be unjust
to convict the defendant. 3 This is a distinction without a differ-
ence: who is to say whether a law is oppressive, unconscionable
or unjust? American jurists review early American history and
note that the English laws that English and colonial juries re-
fused to apply were oppressive, but then reason that today the
United States Government would not allow oppressive or unfair
9. Scott, supra note 8, at 391 ("The criminal trial jury's power to nullify is
unquestionable.").
10. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1102. See Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in
the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 506-07 (1976).
11. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1102.
12. Id. at 1114 n.84. The commentators cite as examples of historical nullifica-
tion: The Trial of Mr. John Lilburne, 5 HOWELL, COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS 407 (Old Baily 1653) (the jury refused to apply an act of Parlia-
ment that banned Lilburne from ever returning to England) [hereinafter HOWELL'S
ST. TR.], The Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 6 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 951
(Old Baily 1670) (the jury refused to convict under the seditious libel laws even
though publication was proven) [hereinafter Penn & Mead's Case] and The Trial of
Mr. John Peter Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 675 (KB. 1735) (the jury refused to
convict under the seditious libel laws).
13. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1114. Commentators cite United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) as an example of modern justice-oriented
jury nullification. In Dougherty, the defendants were charged with breaking into the
Dow Chemical Company. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1117. The break-in was to protest
Dow's involvement with the Vietnam War. Id. at 1120. The defendants argued to the
court that their actions were proper because of Dow's involvement in the Vietnam
War. Id. The court refused to instruct the jury that it could nullify the laws based
on "moral compulsion" or based on a "choice of the lesser evil." Id. at 1121.
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laws to be passed and applied-that is an untenable position.
Therefore, this comment addresses jury nullification as a doctrine
that gives the jury the right to nullify laws that it finds oppres-
sive, unconscionable or overly harsh.
B. Jury Nullification in English History
Although the uproar ensuing from Johnnie Cochran's remarks
in the O.J. Simpson trial make it appear that Cochran was earn-
ing his pay by formulating an original argument, history demon-
strates that the doctrine of jury nullification has been around for
centuries.
The first noted attempt to inform a jury of its right to deter-
mine the law was in 1649. Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburne was
accused of treason for publishing pamphlets that criticized the
English Government. 4 Lilburne, while not questioning the va-
lidity of the law, asked to have counsel assist him in his defense,
but when the court denied his request, Lilburne asked to address
the jury." Lilburne asked the court to allow him to explain to
the jurors that they were the finders of law as well as fact.'
The court summarily rejected Lilburne's statement, but Lilburne
did argue the proposition in his closing remarks. 7 The jury
quickly acquitted Lilburne, although it is unknown if the ac-
quittal was based on fact or law. 8
In a subsequent trial in 1653, Lilburne was again tried, and,
he directly questioned the lawfulness of the act he was accused of
violating." Historians explain Lilburne's defense as arguing
14. The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, 4 HowELL's ST. TR. 1270,
1292, 1320-28 (Old Baily 1649). Lilburne, a leader of the Levellers, was tried for
treason. Scott, supra note 8, at 397. The Levellers was a political group that advo-
cated universal male suffrage and was opposed to the "centralized bench at West-
minster and its elitist legal profession." Id. at 397 n.46.
15. Lilburne, 4 HOWELL'S ST. TR. at 1292-1318.
16. Id. Lilburne asked that he might address the jury:
[T]hat I may speak in my own behalf unto the jury, my countrymen, upon
whose consciences, integrity and honesty, my life, and the lives and liberties
of the honest men of this nation, now lies; who are in law judges of law as
well as fact, and you [the court] only the pronouncers of their sentence, will
and mind ....
Id. at 1379.
17. Id. at 1379.
18. Id. at 1405. Interestingly, after the acquittal, a medal was created with
the inscription: "John Lilburne, saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity of
his jury, who are judge of law as well as fact." Scott, supra note 8, at 399.
19. The Trial of Mr. John Lilburne, 5 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 407 (Old Baily 1653).
Lilburne had been banished from England by Parliament because of his criticisms of
Parliament. Scott, supra note 8, at 401. An act issued by Parliament declared that if
Lilburne was found in England he could be tried and executed. Id.
1128 Vol. 34:1125
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that juries have the right to review a statute and acquit a defen-
dant if the jury finds that the statute is void. 0
In 1670, it was the jury that exercised the right to nullify a
law and acquit two defendants. William Penn and William Mead
were arrested and indicted for "preaching" before an unlawful
assembly. 21 Penn and Mead did not question the evidence pre-
sented at trial, but rather alleged that no law existed which pro-
hibited their conduct.22 After a short deliberation, eight jury
members returned, but four refused to return.23 The jury was
threatened and ordered to further deliberate.24 Upon return, the
jury found Penn guilty of speaking but refused to state whether
the assembly was unlawful.25 The court then threatened the ju-
ry and told it to return with a verdict that the court would ac-
cept.26 Notwithstanding this barrage by the court, the jury stood
its ground and acquitted both defendants.27 The court responded
by fining each juror forty marks and placing them in prison until
20. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1104. Lilburne's defense is described as arguing:
[Tihat the jury had the right and duty to judge a statute or an indictment in
the light of English fundamental law and to acquit the defendant if, despite a
judicial charge to the contrary, the jury found that the statute was void.
Moreover, Lilburne now asserted that the jury ought to acquit the defendant if
it believed that the prescribed punishment was unconscionably severe in light
of the acts proved to have been committed by the defendant. The jury test the
"legality" of the indictment and decide the fairness of the prescribed punish-
ment.
Id. (citing THoMAs A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 159-60 (1985)).
21. Penn & Mead's Case, 6 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 951, 954-55 (Old Baily 1670).
Penn and Mead were Quakers who attempted to enter their normal meeting place
but found they were locked out, so Penn started to preach to the large crowd gath-
ered outside. Penn & Mead's Case, 6 HowELL's ST. TR. at 954-55.
22. Id. at 958-59. Penn stated: "The question is not, whether I am Guilty of
this Indictment, but whether this Indictment be legal. It is too general and imper-
fect an answer to say it is the common-law, unless we knew both where and what
it is." Id. at 959. The Recorder responded: "You are an impertinent fellow, will you
teach the court what law is? It is 'Lex non scripta,' that which many have studied
30 to 40 years to know, and would you have me tell you in a moment?" Id. Penn
replied: "Certainly, if the common law be so hard to be understood, it is far from
being very common." Id. The court then had Penn, whom the court termed a "trou-
blesome fellow," removed from the court room. Id.
23. Id. at 961.
24. Id. at 963-67.
25. Id. at 962-63.
26. Penn & Mead's Case, 6 HOWELL'S ST. TR. at 962-63. The Recorder of the
court told the jury:
fflou shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict that the court will accept;
and you shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall
not think thus to abuse the courts; we will have a verdict by the help of God,
or you shall starve for it.
Id. at 963.
27. Id. at 966.
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the fine was paid.28
Edward Bushell was one of the jurors on Penn's and Mead's
jury that refused to convict.2' The jurors were charged with find-
ing a verdict against the full and manifest weight of the evidence
and the return of an acquittal against the direction of the court
in a matter of law.3° Bushell and the other jurors filed a writ of
habeas corpus to terminate their imprisonment.3 Bushell was
acquitted on both charges. The court, in discussing the first
charge, reasoned that a juror should only be fined if the juror
renders a verdict that is contrary to his own beliefs.32 Address-
ing the second charge, the court reasoned that the law cannot be
determined until the facts are found, therefore, a judge cannot
state the law because the judge cannot determine the facts.33
Many commentators use Bushell to advance the argument that
jury nullification is a historic right.'
In 1783, in Rex v. Shipley," a criminal case brought under
seditious libel laws, Justice Buller instructed the jury that the
question of libel is a question of law to be decided by the court.3"
28. Id. at 967-68.
29. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 6 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 999
(C.P. 1670).
30. Bushell, 6 HOwELL'S ST. TR. at 1002.
31. Id. at 999-1000.
32. Id. at 1020. Chief Justice Vaughan stated: "[A] perjury in facie curie is
punishable by the judge; and such is it if jurors go against their evidence; perhaps a
witness may be punished for perjury in facie curie (which I will not maintain to be
law) but a jury can never be so punished, because the evidence in court is not bind-
ing evidence to a jury, as hath been shewed." Id.
33. Id. at 1010. Chief Justice Vaughan stated:
Without a fact agreed, it is as impossible for a judge, or any other, to
know the law relating to that fact or direct concerning it, as to know an acci-
dent that hath no subject.
Hence it follows, that the judge can never direct what the law is in
any matter controverted, without first knowing the fact; and then it follows,
that without his previous knowledge of the fact, the jury cannot go against his
direction in law, for he could not direct.
But the judge, qua judge, cannot know the fact possibly but from the
evidence which the jury have, but (as will appear) he can never know what
evidence the jury have, and consequently he cannot know the matter of fact,
nor punish the jury for going against their evidence, when he cannot know
what their evidence is.
Id.
34. See Creagan, supra note 7, at 1106, 1107 n.34.
35. 21 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 847 (K.B. 1783).
36. Shipley, 21 HOwELL's ST. TR. at 949. Seditious libel is a written communi-
cation that is intended to provoke the masses to unlawfully change the government.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1357 (6th ed. 1990).
Lord Kenyon, in The King v. Withers, 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1789), in-
structed a jury in a similar manner to that of Justice Buller in Shipley. Sparf &
Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 134 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
1130
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The jury found the defendant "[g]uilty only of publishing;" howev-
er, after further instructions from the court, the jury formulated
the verdict as: "Guilty of publishing; but whether a libel or not
the jury do not find.""7 Thomas Erskine, who represented Wil-
liam Shipley, argued for a new trial on the ground that the jury
had the power and the right to decide the law and the lower
court erred in instructing the jury that the question of libel was
not for the jury's determination. Lord Mansfield refused to ac-
cept Erskine's logic and reasoned that precedence must be fol-
lowed and therefore the question of libel is an issue of law for the
court. 9 Justice Willes dissented and stated that he believed the
jury had both the power and the right to decide the law.'
Lord Mansfield's opinion outraged many who still believed that
juries needed to have the right to decide issues of law.4' In 1792,
Parliament responded by passing a statute titled "An act to re-
move doubts respecting the functions of juries in cases of li-
bel."42 Mr. Fox, in introducing the bill, noted that if juries have
the power to nullify laws, such a power must be meant to be
used.' Lord Blackburn, of the House of Lords, noted that the
37. Shipley, 21 HOWELL'S ST. TR. at 950-55.
38- Id. at 956-70.
39. Id. at 970, 1031-41. Because neither the judge nor the jury had decided
whether the statements were libelous, the judgment was eventually arrested because,
as found in the indictment, it was not libel. Id. at 1042-46.
40. Id. at 1040-41. Justice Willes stated:
ITihat upon a plea of Not guilty, or upon the general issue on an indictment
or information for a libel, the jury had not only the power, but a constitution-
al right, to examine, if they thought fit, the criminality or innocence of the
paper charged as a libel; declaring it to be his selected opinion, that, notwith-
standing the production of sufficient proof of the publication, the jury might
upon such examination acquit the defendant generally, though in opposition to
the directions of the judge.
Id.
41. Scott, supra note 8, at 416.
42. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 134. The statute was commonly referred to
as "Fox's Libel Act." Id. The act stated:
[1]t be competent to the jury impaneled to try the same to give their verdict
upon the whole matter put in issue; . . . [and is] therefore declared and enact-
ed that on every such trial the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general
verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue . .. and
shall not be required or directed, by the court or judge ... to find the defen-
dant or defendants guilty ....
Id. at 134-35.
43. Id. at 136. Mr. Fox stated:
[11f a power was vested in any person, it was surely meant to be exercised;
[that] there was a power vested in the jury to judge the law and fact, as
often they were united, and, if the jury were not to be understood to have a
right to exercise that power, the constitution would never have entrusted them
with it; but they knew it was the province of the jury to judge of law and
fact, and this was the case, not of murder only, but of felony, high treason,
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Parliament "adopted almost the words and quite the substance"
of Justice Willes statement quoted earlier in Shipley." Justice
Gray, dissenting in Sparf & Hansen, argued that the statute was
designed to declare that juries have the ability to judge both mat-
ters of law and fact.45
C. Jury Nullification in Colonial America
In Colonial America, colonial lawyers and jurors believed in
and made extensive use of jury nullification to oppose oppressive
British laws. In 1735, John Peter Zenger ("Zenger") was arrested
and tried under seditious libel laws.' Under the seditious libel
laws, truth was not a defense.47 Zenger's attorney, Andrew
Hamilton, argued that the jury had the "right, beyond all dis-
pute, to determine both the law and the fact" and conclude that
truth was a viable defense.' Hamilton's strategy was to concede
the factual question of whether publication had occurred, and
argue the legal question of whether truth should be a defense."'
Because it was settled law that truth was not a defense in a
prosecution for seditious libel, Hamilton argued that the question
of libelousness should be decided by the jury.0 Hamilton exten-
sively quoted parts of Bushell to the jury and argued that the
court, by declaring what was libel, had taken away the jury's
power to apply the law to the facts.51 Hamilton implored the
jury to nullify the law and acquit his client.5 2 Although the court
instructed the jury that the law is for the court to decide, the
jury agreed with Hamilton's argument and quickly returned a
and of every other criminal indictment [and that] it must be left in all cases
to a jury to infer the guilt of men, and an English subject could not lose his
life but by a judgment of his peers.
Id. (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 134 (citation omitted). See supra note 40 for Justice willes' com-
ments.
45. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 135 (Gray, J., dissenting).
46. The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 676, 676-78
(K.B. 1735). Zenger was a New York printer who published a newspaper titled The
New York Weekly Journal. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say
No, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 168, 173 (1972). The newspaper was designed to inform the
people about corrupt government officials. Id.
47. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1109.
48. Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S ST. TR. at 706. Had the jury followed the court's
instructions, a finding of guilty would have been automatic. Scheffin, supra note 46,
at 173.
49. Zenger, 17 HOwELL's ST. TR. at 693-94.
50. Id. at 706-22.
51. Id. at 716-18.
52. Id. at 721-22.
1132 Vol. 34:1125
1996 Comments 1133
verdict of not guilty.58
When the American Colonies declared independence, the doc-
trine of jury nullification continued to be argued to, and used by
juries. In 1794, in Georgia v. Brailsford,' United States Su-
preme Court Chief Justice John Jay instructed the jury on the
appropriate law to be applied to the facts.55 The Chief Justice
then added that the jury had the right to decide both the proper
law as well as the facts. 6 Many commentators argue that
Brailsford clearly demonstrates the Supreme Court's early view
that juries have the right to determine the law.57
Two other examples of Colonial America's attitude toward jury
nullification are found under the Embargo Law and the Fugitive
Slave Law. In 1808, a defendant was charged with violating the
Embargo Law." The defendant was clearly guilty under the law,
but his attorney vehemently argued that the law was unconstitu-
tional even though the judge had previously determined that the
law was constitutional. 5 Another example of juries' willingness
to nullify laws is found in cases under the Fugitive Slave Law.6 °
Many people were opposed to the law on moral grounds, which
made most prosecutions under the law unsuccessful."'
Not until the late 1800's did evidence of judicial restraint
53. Id. at 722-23.
54. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
55. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4-5.
56. Id. The Chief Justice stated: "But it must be observed that by the same
law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you[, the jury,]
have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine
the law as well as the fact in controversy." Id.
Brailsford was a civil trial that fell under the original jurisdiction of the
United. States Supreme Court. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 175.
57. Simson, supra note 10, at 499 (citing Kuntsler, Jury Nullification in Con-
science Cases, 10 VA. J. INr'L L. 71, 75 (1969), Russell C. Richardson, Jury Nullifi-
cation: Justice or Anarchy?, 80 CASE & COM., Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 31, Scheffin, supra
note 46, at 168, 175-76 and Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution,
16 CATHOLIC LAW. 224, 234-35 (1970)).
Professor Simson repudiates this conclusion and notes that one of the jus-
tices that heard Brailsford, Justice Patterson, rejected Brailsford's instruction in a
later case and told the jury that it could not question the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act of 1798. Id. at 500 (citing Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (C.C.D.
Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646)).
Justice Harlan, in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), dis-
misses Brailsford as being incorrectly reported. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 65.
58. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 176. An Embargo Law is a "[glovernment order
prohibiting commercial trade with individuals or businesses of other specified na-
tions." BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 522 (6th ed. 1990).
59. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 176. The jury found the defendant not guilty.
Id.
60. The Fugitive Slave Law was passed in 1850 and made it illegal to aid
runaway slaves. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 177.
61. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 177.
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emerge. Four cases appear to reject the doctrine of jury nullifica-
tion. In United States v. Battiste,s2 Battiste was a crewman on
the United States Ship America.' The ship was under contract
to transport African slaves between points on the African
coast.' Battiste was charged under a United States law that
prohibited any United States ship from transporting individuals
with the intent to make them slaves."5 Justice Story, in conclud-
ing the charge to the jury, stated that he disagreed with
Battiste's counsel and rejected the argument that the jury could
decide the law."6 The court reasoned that while juries may have
the ability to nullify laws, they do not have the moral right to
take such actions.67
In Commonwealth v. Porter,"8 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court specifically stated that a jury could not determine ques-
tions of law. 9 Although the holding in Porter did not follow the
prior cases in Massachusetts, its effect was limited.71 In prac-
tice, the result was that while the judge gave the jury the law,
the defense attorney was still permitted to argue the law to the
jury, ostensibly so the jury would better understand the law.71
62. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
63. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
64. Id. Slaves were transported along the coast of Angola, a Portuguese pos-
session, in 1835. Id. Neither the owner of America, its captain, nor Battiste had any
monetary interest in the slaves, nor did they cause the slavery. Id. at 1043-44. The
America was merely hired by the slave owners to transport the slaves. Id. At this
time in history slavery was still legal in the Portuguese province. Id- at 1045.
65. Id. at 1044. The law that Battiste was charged under read:
That if any citizen, &c. or any person whatever, being of the crew or ship's
company of any ship or vessel, owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, or
in behalf of any citizen or citizens of the United States, shall land from any
such ship or vessel, and on any foreign shore, seize any negro or mulatto, not
held to service or labor by the laws of either of the states or territories, with
intent to make such negro or mulatto a slave; or shall decoy, or forcibly bring
or carry, or shall receive such negro or mulatto, on board of any such ship or
vessel, with intent as foresaid, such citizen or person shall be adjudged a
pirate, and on conviction thereof, &c. shall suffer death.
Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 1043. Justice Story stated: "My opinion is, that the jury are no
more judges of law in a capital case or other criminal case, upon the plea of not
guilty, than they are in every civil case, tried upon the general issue." Id.
67. Id. The court was concerned that if a jury could decide the law, the law
would become uncertain. Id. The court also was concerned that if the jury erred, the
injured party would have no redress. Id.
68. 10 Mass. (Met.) 263 (1845).
69. Scheflin, supra note 46, at 178.
70. Id.
71. Id. In fact, opposition to the Porter decision was so adamant that at the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 an amendment was introduced that
would have overruled Porter. Id. The amendment was eventually defeated, but a
statute was later passed with the same purpose. Id. Ironically, a short time later,
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In United States v. Morris,72 the defendant was prosecuted
under the Fugitive Slave Acts.73 One of the defendant's attor-
neys, in addressing the jury, stated that it was the finder of the
law and if any of the jurors believed the Fugitive Slave Acts was
unconstitutional, the jury was obligated to disregard the court's
instructions.74 The court stopped the attorney from continuing
this argument to the jury, but the court allowed the attorney to
argue out of the presence of the jury, and then the court ruled on
the argument.75 Justice Curtis, writing for the court, reviewed
the attorney's argument and cases that supported and opposed
the argument and concluded that juries do not have the right to
decide questions of law.7" Justice Curtis started his analysis
with Article VI of the United States Constitution77 and reasoned
that the Constitution requires that all actions by the government
should apply equally to all citizens wherever located.7" He also
noted that Article VI binds judges by the Constitution, but noted
that there is no such requirement on jurors.79 In discussing
Bushell, Justice Curtis dismissed it merely as holding that a
juror cannot be prosecuted for a verdict because it cannot be de-
termined if the juror believed or disbelieved the testimony.0 In
discussing Rex v. Shipley and Fox's Libel Act, the justice noted
that although the language of Fox's Libel Act appears to give the
jury the right to decide the law, the justice concluded that the
Act had just the opposite meaning.8" The justice also reviewed
Chief Justice Shaw held that the statute merely codified the common law as articu-
lated in Porter. Id. at 178-79.
72. 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
73. The Fugitive Slave Acts were passed by Congress in 1783 and 1850 and
regulated the surrender and deportation of escaped slaves who fled into another
territory, normally a "free" state. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 671 (6th ed. 1990).
74. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1331.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1331, 1336.
77. Article VI, Section 2 reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and
the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
78. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1332. The justice stated: "[W]hatever was done by
the government of the United States should be standing laws, operating equally in
all parts of the country . . . and binding to the same extent, and with precisely the
same effect, on all." Id.
79. Id. at 1332-33.
80. Id. at 1333.
81. Id. Justice Curtis stated:
The defendant's counsel argued that this law had declared that, on
trials for libel, the jury should be allowed to pass on law and fact, as in other
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an Ohio case and an Act of Congress to support his position. 2
The justice summarily dismissed Chief Justice Jay's remark in
Georgia v. Brailsford, stating simply that he doubted the accura-
cy of the reported case.83
Finally, the watershed American jury nullification case was
Sparf & Hansen v. United States." In Sparf & Hansen, the jury
deliberated in a case involving two sailors accused of murder on
the high seas.8" The law under which they were prosecuted al-
lowed a jury to find defendants guilty of a lesser included offense;
however, in Sparf & Hansen the trial judge instructed the jury
that the evidence did not support a finding of a lesser included
offense. 6 The jury interrupted its deliberations to ask if the on-
ly choice it had was either a finding of guilty or not guilty." The
court replied that because the jury had to follow the law as found
by the court, it could only return a verdict of guilty or not
guilty." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's instruc-
tions, including the statement that the jury must accept the law
as received from the court.8 9
The majority reviewed numerous English, federal and state
decisions to support its position that a jury must apply the law
as given by the court." The majority also reviewed certain cases
criminal cases. But this is erroneous. Language somewhat like this occurs in
the statute, but in quite a different connection, and as I think, with just the
opposite meaning.
Id. at 1334.
82. Id. at 1334. The justice discussed Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 427
(1842), in which that court addressed a jury's right to determine the law. Id. The
justice noted that the Ohio Bill of Rights contains language similar to that found in
the Sedition Act, but the Ohio court concluded that: "It would seem from this that
the framers . . . did not imagine that juries were rightfully judges of law." Id.
The justice also discussed the Act of the 29th of April, 1802, 2 Stat. 156,
that allows questions to be certified to the supreme court. Id. The justice thought it
would be unthinkable for a question to be certified, answered by the Supreme Court,
and then a jury would have the right to ignore the answer. Id.
83. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1335.
84. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
85. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 52. Two defendants, sailors on board the
American vessel Hesper, were charged with the murder of another sailor on board
the ship. Id.
86. Id. at 59-60.
87. Id. at 61.
88. Id. at 61 n.1. The Court stated that "as one of the tribunals of the coun-
try, a jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it should receive from
the court." Id.
89. Id. at 106.
90. The Supreme Court cited, among others, Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 1 (1794) (the jury has a right to judge both law and facts, but it is assumed
that the courts are the best judges of the law), United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas.
1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545) ("In each [case] they have the physical power
to disregard the law, as laid down by the court. But I deny that, in any case . . .
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that appear to hold that juries have the right and/or the power to
disregard the law as postulated by the courts. The Supreme
Court reviewed the Case of Fries91 and noted that many propo-
nents of jury nullification cite Justice Chase's statement to sup-
port a jury's right to nullify the court's law. 2 In Fries, Justice
Chase stated that juries are to decide "both the law and facts, on
their consideration of the whole case."" The Supreme Court
found this as unpersuasive and noted that later that same year,
Justice Chase rejected an attorney's suggestion that a jury could
review the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.94 The Court
further noted that Justice Chase, in rejecting counsel's sugges-
tion, realized that the power of the court is separate from the
power of the jury. 5
they have the moral right to decide the law according to their own notions or plea-
sure."), Rex v. Shipley, 21 HowELL's ST. TR. 847 (1783) (In accordance with English
law, juries do not decide a question of law), Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Mass.
(Met.) 263, 276 (1845) ("It is a well-settled principle, lying at the foundation of jury
trial . . . the proper province and duty of judges to consider and decide all questions
of law . . . and the jury to decide all questions of fact.") and Duffy v. People, 105
N.E. 839 (N.Y. 1914) (the jury should follow the court's instructions, but the jury
has "the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded
as rightful, although the law has provided no means . . . of reviewing their deci-
sions whether of law or fact.").
91. 9 F. Cas. 924 (C.C. Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127). John Fries was tried for trea-
son for "levying war against the United States, contrary to the constitution." Fries, 9
F. Cas. at 930.
92. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 69-70.
93. Fries, 9 F. Cas. at 930. In Fries, Justice Chase stated:
It is the duty of the court in this case, and in all criminal cases, to state to
the jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the jury are to
decide on the present, and in all criminal cases, both the law and the facts,
on their consideration of the whole case.
Id.
94. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 70. See United States v. Callender, 25 F.
Cas. 239 (C.C. Vir. 1800) (No. 14,709). In Callender, the defendant was on trial for
libel, and the defendant's attorney attempted to argue that the jury could declare
the libel law unconstitutional. Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 252-54. Although Justice
Chase stated that "we all know that juries have the right to decide the law, as well
as the fact," he disagreed with the concept that the jury could rule on the constitu-
tionality of the law. Id. at 256-57. The justice stated that "the judicial power of the
United States is the only proper and competent authority to decide whether any
statute . . . [is] contrary to . . . the federal constitution." Id. The Supreme Court
stated that Justice Chase "was appalled at the suggestion by learned counsel that
the jury were entitled, of right, to determine the constitutional validity of the act of
[C]ongress under which the accused was indicted." Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 70.
95. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 71. Justice Chase stated:
I have uniformly delivered the opinion "that the petit jury have a right to de-
cide the law as well as the fact in criminal cases;" but it never entered into
my mind that they, therefore, had a right to determine the constitutionality of
any statute of the United States.
Id. (citing Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 258).
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The Supreme Court also discussed Kane v. Commonwealth,96
an oft-cited case by jury nullification proponents.97 In Kane, the
court stated that a jury's power to judge the law is guaranteed in
Pennsylvania.98 The Supreme Court interpreted two subsequent
Pennsylvania cases, Nicholson v. Commonwealth" and Com-
monwealth v. McManus,'° to clarify Kane and support the
proposition that a court decides the law.1"'
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed Bushell, by merely
stating that what Bushell settled was that when a jury renders a
general verdict, it cannot be determined whether it disregarded
the court's instructions or whether jurors proceeded upon their
own views of the facts.
0 2
D. Modern Jurisprudence
As discussed above, the application of the doctrine of jury nul-
lification has swung like a pendulum. Before the American Revo-
lution and well into the nineteenth century, jury nullification was
widely accepted and used. Late in the nineteenth century, the
doctrine of jury nullification fell out of favor and was repudiated
by the judiciary. In the 1950's the doctrine was not affirmatively
used by defense lawyers, but some white juries outraged many
Northerners and civil rights advocates by disregarding the law
and acquitting defendants charged with killing African-Ameri-
cans. 103
96. 89 Pa. 522 (1879).
97. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 85.
98. Kane, 89 Pa. at 527. Chief Justice Sharswood stated that [the power of
the jury to judge of the law in a criminal case is one of the most valuable securities
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." Id.
99. 96 Pa. 503, 505 (1879) (holding the court has the right to instruct the jury
on the law, and to caution the jury from finding contrary to the courts instructions).
100. 21 A. 1018 (Pa. 1891). In McManus, the trial court, in answering a point
of charge stating that the jury is the judge of the law, stated, "the statement of the
law by the court [is] the best evidence of the law within [your] reach . . . [you are]
to be guided by what the court has said with reference to the law." McManus, 21 A.
at 1018. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's answer and
stated that it was consistent with Kane. Id. at 1019-20. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated: "A judge who instructs a jury in a criminal case that they may dis-
regard the law as laid down by the court errs as widely as the judge who gives
them a binding instruction upon the law." Id. at 1020. In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Mitchell opined that the jury is not the judge of the law and the answer to the
point of charge should have been an "unqualified negative." Id. (Mitchell, J., concur-
ring).
101. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 85.
102. Id. at 90-91.
103. Thomas G. Watts, Growing Movement in America Seeks Broader Jury Dis-
cretion, THE CHARLESTON GAzETTE, Nov. 14, 1995, at P5A. Two famous cases in-
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In United States v. Spock,"1 ' the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals bolstered the argument that a jury may disregard the law
as posited by a court and that the jury may be the finder of law
as well as fact. In Spock, the court ruled that a jury's power is
destroyed when special interrogatories are used in a criminal tri-
al. 05 It appears that the court did not want to limit juries' abili-
ties to render general verdicts, and implicit in a general verdict
is the fact that in deliberations, a jury may decide to disregard
the law and apply what it believes to be the better rule of law.
The court did not address the issue of whether an attorney may
make the jury aware of this power, just that a jury implicitly has
such a power.
In United States v. Dougherty,' the court specifically ad-
dressed the issue of whether an attorney could have the jury in-
structed on its power to nullify. The court of appeals, in a two-to-
one decision, upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury
about the doctrine of jury nullification."' The court noted that
in the Anglo-American judicial system, juries have the power to
ignore evidence and a court's instructions concerning the law.""
The court cited the acquittal of Peter Zenger and the numerous
acquittals under the Fugitive Slave Act as historical exam-
ples."°
The court noted, however, that the "tide" was turned in
Battiste."' The court acknowledged that even after Battiste,
there was still some proponents of jury nullification, but the
court cited Sparf & Hansen and stated that the law was now
settled."'
II. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING JURY NULLIFICATION
A. Historically No Such Right Existed in England or America
As evidenced by the majority and dissenting opinions in Sparf
& Hansen, English and American history can be used to support
or refute the doctrine of jury nullification. The rationale of the
volved the slaying of Emmitt Till and civil rights leader Medgar Evers. Id.
104. 416 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1969).
105. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182-83.
106. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
107. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130-37.
108. Id. at 1130. The court stated: "The pages of history shine on instances of
the jury's exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontradicted evidence and in-
structions of the judges." Id.
109. Id.




majority in Sparf & Hansen, as discussed in Section I, articulates
the standard argument used by opponents of jury nullification
when arguing that no historic right exists to support jury nullifi-
cation.
B. Legislatures Make Laws-Not the "Wacko Fringe"
Opponents of the doctrine of jury nullification argue that it is
the function of elected legislatures, and not twelve unelected
individuals, to make laws."2 These opponents argue that jury
nullification is the "antithesis of democracy" and that juries have
no such power."' Professor Simson argues that a jury is merely
a group of "randomly selected individuals" who answer to no
one." 4 Simson maintains that juries which nullify laws passed
by an elected body "frustrate the people's sense of justice.""'
Other commentators argue that today's use of jury nullification is
not to protect citizens against oppressive governmental policies,
but instead to allow juries to adopt a "defendant's view . . .of
morality."' The opponents describe the jury nullification move-
ment as an "effort by grass roots organizations, unsuccessful in
having their policies promoted and endorsed by Congress or their
state legislatures, to sneak their political agendas in the back
door by making the jury the new determinant of public poli-
cy."" 7 Former Missouri Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, in com-
menting on the modern movement of jury nullification, stated:
"The movement seeks to institutionalize jury rebellion. Jurors
would follow only those laws they liked and ignore the ones they
didn't like... [and] is an attempt by the wacko fringe to further
its anti-government agenda.""'
One commentator, while not conceding that throughout history
juries have never had the right to nullify, concludes that the
same factors that once legitimized the practice are no longer
present." The commentator reasons that in early America, the
judiciary was mostly composed of laymen, and therefore, juries
were just as qualified to determine the law as were judges."
112. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1123-24.
113. Id. at 1124.
114. Simson, supra note 10, at 512.
115. Id. Professor Simson reasons that because Congress is elected, a law
passed by Congress evidences the majority's view. Id.
116. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1113. See Scott, supra note 8, at 420.
117. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1113 (citing Scott, supra note 8, at 419-23).
118. Lindecke, supra note 5, at 5B.
119. Scott, supra note 8, at 419.
120. Id. at 417.
1140 Vol. 34:1125
Related to this is the argument that allowing jury nullification
leads to inconsistency in the application of laws.121 This argu-
ment reasons that if jury nullification is allowed, laws will not be
uniformly applied, but rather application will depend on the
particular jury. 22
C. Jury Nullification Frustrates a Central Government's Ability to
Implement Nationwide Policies
Opponents argue that when a jury nullifies a law and acts as
the "conscience of the community," it is not speaking for the
nation's conscience, but just a narrow community's con-
science." Professor Simson states that local biases may "immu-
nize criminal acts visited upon members of society's 'discrete and
insular minorities' [and] is not one that [he] at least can take
lightly."'
24
Other arguments against the right of jury nullification include
the argument that the use of jury nullification inhibits legal re-
form." Curiously, the argument reasons that by jury nullifica-
tion "eliminating some of the injustices that would result from
the enforcement of an unpopular [oppressive] law," the communi-
ty will not demand legislative reform and oppressive laws will
not be repealed." And finally, the argument is advanced that
jury nullification violates the principle of fair warning. 7 Oppo-
nents argue that a jury may disregard the law and find a legally
innocent defendant guilty.'28
III. REASONS FOR JURY NULLIFICATION
A. Historical Justification
In Sparf & Hansen, Justice Gray, joined by Justice Shiras,
authored a lengthy dissent. 29 The dissent took issue with the
fact that the question of life or death was not properly decided by
121. Creagan, supra note 7, at 1126.
122. Id. at 1127 n.143. The reply to this argument is that inconsistent applica-
tion of oppressive laws is better than the consistent application. Id. Moreover, this
critique of the doctrine of jury nullification presumes that laws are strictly enforced
in the absence of jury nullification. Id.
123. Simson, supra note 10, at 514.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) (Stone, J.)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 515.
127. Id. at 515-16.
128. Simson, supra note 10, at 516.
129. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 110 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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the jury as required by the Constitution."'0 The dissent re-
viewed English authorities, Colonial and state jurisprudence, and
federal cases and concluded that a jury in a criminal case has the
right to determine the law.13 ' Justice Gray started his analysis
with the Magna Carta and noted that defendants were given a
right to a jury, and while juries had the right to "refer a pure
question of law to the court," they were not required to do so."s
The dissent then discussed British jurisprudence and concluded
that although there were periods of exceptions, juries had the
power and the right to disregard the law.'33 The dissent then
reviewed early cases which were decided just after the indepen-
dence of the United States. Justice Gray first discussed Rex v.
Shipley," and noted two important occurrences during that tri-
al. First, the defendant's attorney, while arguing for a new trial,
argued that "the jury, upon the general issue, had not only the
power but the right, to decide the law."" During this hearing,
the leading counsel for the Crown agreed with the defense coun-
sel's statement.3 ' Although Lord Mansfield objected to the ter-
minology, he accepted the principle. 3 ' The second occurrence
130. Id.
131. Id. at 114. The dissent stated:
It is our deep and settled conviction, confirmed by a reexamination of the au-
thorities under the responsibility of taking part in the consideration and deci-
sion of the capital case now before the court, that the jury, upon the general
issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, have the right, as well as the
power, to decide, according to their own judgment and consciences, all ques-
tions, whether of law or of fact, involved in that issue.
Id.
132. Id. at 114-15.
133. Id. at 115-16. The dissent noted that during the reign of Charles II, some
judges attempted to punish juries for not following the law as instructed by the
court. Id. at 117. However, Justice Gray noted that when appealed, the lower courts
were reversed. Id. In reviewing British jurisprudence, the dissent also discussed
Bushel. Id. at 119. Finally, the dissent discussed the Trial of the Seven Bishops, in
which the defendants were charged with seditious libel. Id. at 124. Four judges of
the King's Bench instructed the jury. Id. at 124-25. Lord Chief Justice Wright stated
that the only fact question was whether publication occurred because whether the
statements are libel is a question of law and he stated that it was libel. Id. Mr.
Justice Allybone agreed with the Lord Chief. Id. at 125. However, Justices Holloway
and Powell told the jury that they did not believe it was a libel, and said it was
left to the jury. Id. Therefore, Justice Gray concluded that the judges concurred in
allowing the jury to settle the question of law. Id. at 125-26.
134. 21 HoWELL'S ST. TR. 847 (1783).
135. Sparf & Hansen, 156 U.S. at 133 (Gray, J., dissenting).
136. Id. The Crown's counsel stated: "[H]e agreed ... that it is the right of
the jury . . . to take upon themselves the decision of every question of law neces-
sary to the acquittal of the defendant." Id.
137. ld. Justice Gray stated:
Lord Mansfield observing that he should call it the power, not the right, he
adhered to the latter expression; and added, that he thought it an important
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Justice Gray discussed was Justice Willes' dissent in Shipley.
Justice Willes noted the Crown's concurrence with. the defense
lawyer's statement and stated that he believed that the content
of the statement was the law of the land. 
38
The dissent's opinion has been echoed by recent commentators.
One commentator noted that in America, most jurisdictions at
one time held that juries had the right to nullify laws.'39
B. If a Jury has the Power-It has the Right
As discussed earlier, a jury that renders a general verdict
implicitly has the power to nullify the law because the jury does
not articulate its reasons for its verdict. Several commentators
argued in favor of Texas legislation that would have required a
court to inform the jury of its right to disregard the court's in-
struction. " The proponents of the legislation argued that be-
cause the jury already had the power, the legislation would mere-
ly instruct the jury on their power and "stop deceiving them."'
As a historical review shows, almost all jurists agree that
when a jury renders a general verdict in a criminal trial, it has
the power to disregard the law. The main reason for this power is
the underlying belief that the process of jury deliberation is sa-
cred and should not be interfered with. Therefore, when a jury
renders a verdict of not guilty, the community does not know
whether the jury did not believe certain witnesses, had a reason-
privilege, and which, on particular occasions, as, for instance, if a proper cen-
sure of the measures of the servants of the Crown were to be construed by a
judge to be libellous, it would be laudable and justifiable in them to exercise.
Id. (citation omitted).
138. Id. In dissent, Justice Wiles stated: "I conceive it to be the law of this
country, that the jury . .. upon an indictment or information for a libel, have a
constitutional right, if they think fit . . . I believe no man will venture to say they
have not the power, but I mean expressly to say they have the right." Id.
139. See Scott, supra note 8, at 419. Scott states: "Unlike mother England, in
every jurisdiction which addressed the question, state and federal, American juries
had the right to decide the law." Id. at 416 (citing Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as
Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1939) and Note, The Changing Role
of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964)).
140. See Creagan, supra note 7, at 1126. The Texas bill was introduced in
1991, but was voted down by the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence. Id. at 1121.
141. Id. at 1126. The proponents supported their argument by stating that the
right of a jury to nullify is deeply rooted in the common law and the Texas Consti-
tution. Id. at 1126 n.141. Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution gives "juries in
libel cases as in other cases . . . the right to determine the law." Id. (citing TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 8). The proponents argued that the "as in other cases" language
meant that the legislation created no new rights. Id. (citing Hearings on Texas




able doubt, or disregarded the law.
Jurists disagree about whether a defendant has the right to
have the jury instructed about its power to nullify the law. Argu-
ing that there is no right to inform the jury of this power leads to
uncertainty and inequities. A jury that in deliberation decides
that it disagrees with a law, but believes that it is bound by the
law as given by the court, will end up convicting a defendant
even though the result is against the jurors' beliefs. Can this be
called justice? Another jury could decide that it will disregard the
law, but if asked to explain its verdict, will just mention reason-
able doubt. The result should be the same, but because we have
kept one jury in ignorance, we have forced different results. The
jury that believed it could not disregard the law applied and
followed the law but justice was not served.
One commentator argues that while a jury cannot blatantly
disregard a court's instruction, a jury usually has ample discre-
tion, which allows the jury to make the law.' 2 According to
Professor Friedman, two reasons justify this conclusion. First,
many laws and statutes cannot be written to cover every conceiv-
able situation.1" These laws and statutes are given to juries,
and the juries must at times interpret the law to be able to apply
it to the particular factual situation with which they are deal-
ing.'" Second, Professor Friedman argues that we as a commu-
nity are "willing" to allow juries to determine rules once a legis-
lature has set out a general policy prescription.'"
C. The Spirit of the Law, Not the Letter
Some commentators argue that justice is promoted by inform-
ing juries that they have the right to disregard the law when
application of the law would result in an unjust result.'" These
commentators argue that common sense and community stan-
dards are important factors applied by juries that ensure that
"the spirit of the law and not the letter" produce justice.'47 Ear-
ly common law was based on general principles, and these gener-
al principles were applied to particular facts. With this system,
there was flexibility and common sense could be employed.
142. See Richard D. Friedman, Symposium: Generalized Inferences, Individual
Merits, and Jury Discretion, 66 B.U.L. REv. 509 (July 1986).
143. Friedman, supra note 142, at 511.
144. Id.
145. Id.




Jury lawlessness is the great corrective in the administration of law."
Ideally, a court will instruct the jury on the law, the jury will
find the facts, apply the law as given by the court and render a
verdict that complies with the law and the jurors' consciences. In
such a case, both the "law of the land" will be followed and jus-
tice will be done. Whether a jury was disregarding the seditious
libel law and acquitting John Zenger or refusing to convict under
the Fugitive Slave Acts, juries have disregarded laws and the
results are that justice was served.
This comment argues for the limited use of the right of jury
nullification. The right of jury nullification has some historical
basis, however, more importantly, the "right" should exist be-
cause the jury already has the power, and because the spirit of
the law is what is important, not the obscure words making up a
law. Juries truly are the final safeguard between the govern-
ment and the people.
Some might think that allowing a jury to disregard the law as
given by a court will lead to the downfall of our judicial system
and our nation, but where would our nation be without the
Penn's and Zenger's of yesterday? Or, more importantly, where
would we be without the brave jurors who took on the system to
ensure justice was secured.
John T. Reed
148. Dean Roscoe Pound, quoted in Scheflin, supra note 46, at 182 (citing Dean
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1910)).
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